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Barry Smith 
WHY POLISH PHILOSOPHY DOES NOT EXIST 
1. The Scandal of “Continental Philosophy” 
There are many hundreds of courses taught under the title “Continental 
Philosophy” (C.P.) each year in North-American universities. Such 
courses deal not with philosophy on the continent of Europe as a whole, 
however, but rather with a highly selective portion of Franco-German 
philosophy, centred above all around the person of Martin Heidegger. 
Around him is gathered a rotating crew of currently fashionable, 
primarily French thinkers, each successive generation of which claims 
itself the “end” of philosophy (or of “man,” or of “reason,” of “the 
subject,” of “identity” etc.) as we know it. A sort of competition then 
exists to produce ever wilder and more dadaistic claims along these lines, 
a competition that bears comparison, in more than one respect, with the 
competition among Hollywood film directors to outdo each other in 
producing ever more shocking or brutal or inhuman films. 
 The later Husserl, Heidegger’s teacher, is sometimes taken account of 
in courses of this “Continental Philosophy”; not, however, Husserl’s own 
teacher Brentano and not, for example, such important twentieth-century 
German philosophers as Ernst Cassirer or Nicolai Hartmann. French 
philosophers working in the tradition of Poincaré or Duhem or Bergson 
or Gilson are similarly ignored, as, of course, are Austrian or 
Scandinavian or Czech philosophers. 
 What, then, is the moment of unity of this “Continental Philosophy”? 
What is it that Heidegger and Derrida and Luce Irigaray have in common, 
which distinguishes them from phenomenologists such as Reinach or 
Scheler or the famous Daubert? The answer, it seems, is: antipathy to 
science, or more generally, antipathy to learning and to scholarly 
activity, to all the normal bourgeois purposes of the Western university 
(and we note in passing that, as far as phenomenology is concerned, it 
was Heidegger who was responsible for terminating that previously 
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healthy scientific line which had brought forth such masterpieces as 
Brentano’s Psychology form an Empirical Standpoint and Husserl’s 
Logical Investigations). This rejection of the values associated with 
normal scholarly activity is combined, further, at least in the case of 
those French thinkers accredited as “Continental Philosophers” – with a 
substitution of politics for science (where politics, too, is to be 
understood in a broad sense  a sense broad enough to include also the 
adolescent fringe). Philosophy thereby becomes transformed into a 
strange type of ideologically motivated social criticism. 
 This transformation is sometimes defended, especially by American 
apologists for “Continental Philosophy” such as Richard Rorty, by appeal 
to an argument along the following lines: 
i. All scientific activity is in any case an exercise of social power 
(here the work of Kuhn is often called in aid). 
ii. The putative distinctions between “knowledge” and “power” or 
between “descriptive” and “performative utterances” are therefore 
spurious  such distinctions must be “deconstructed” (in the 
manner of Foucault et al.). 
Hence: 
iii. Philosophers should cast aside the pretension that they are seeking 
knowledge and should instead engage exclusively in the struggle 
to shift the relations of power in society (and here we note that it 
is above all radical feminist groupings who have gained most from 
the widespread acceptance, in North America, of different versions 
of this argument). 
(The problems with the argument are, of course, legion. To mention just 
one obvious stumbling block: if this is indeed an “argument” in defense 
of what might best be described as a grab for power on the part of certain 
groups, then this can only be because there is, after all, a distinction 
between descriptive and performative utterances, for if its premises did 
not themselves have validity as descriptive truths, then the argument 
would lose all force as justification.)  
 That the discipline of philosophy has been subject  in certain 
circles  to a transformation of the sort described is at the same time 
masked by the use of new styles of writing which are designed to fool 
outsiders and to protect the circles of initiates from potentially damaging 
criticism. The most prominent mark of such styles of writing is the heavy 
use of pseudo-scientific jargonizing inspired by sociology and 
psychoanalysis. In addition, and especially in “post-modern” circles, they 
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are marked by the utilization of various tricks of irony and self-
“quotation,” by means of which the authors of the new philosophy seek 
to distance themselves from the responsibility of making assertions 
which might be judged as true or false. Finally, however, the new writing 
style is often marked by the use of what can only be called pornographic 
devices. Consider the following characteristically pretentious passage, 
chosen at random from Derrida’s Spurs, in which the French Doctor 
Criminale undertakes to “deconstruct” the petit-bourgeois assumption 
according to which the two concepts of truth and castration would be 
somehow distinct: 
The feminine distance abstracts truth from itself in a suspension of the 
relation with castration. This relation is suspended much as one might 
tauten or stretch a canvas, or a relation, which nevertheless remains – 
suspended – in indecision. In the HSRFȒ. It is with castration that this 
relation is suspended, not with the truth of castration – in which the 
woman does [not1] believe anyway – and not with the truth inasmuch as it 
might be castration. Nor is it the relation with truth-castration that is 
suspended, for that is precisely a man’s affair. That is the masculine 
concern, the concern of the male who has never come of age, who is 
never sufficiently sceptical or dissimulating. In such an affair the male, in 
his credulousness and naivety (which is always sexual, always pretending 
even at times to masterful expertise), castrates himself and from the 
secretion of his act fashions the snare of truth-castration. (Perhaps at this 
point one ought to interrogate – and “unboss” – the metaphorical 
fullblown sail of truth’s declamation, of the castration and 
phallocentrism, for example in Lacan’s discourse.) (Derrida 1978, 
pp. 59f ) 
Or consider this pudding of similar nonsense from Luce Irigaray:  
Gynecology, dioptrics, are no longer by right a part of metaphysics  that 
supposedly unsexed anthropos-logos whose actual sex is admitted only by 
its omission and exclusion from consciousness, and by what is said in its 
margins. And what if the “I” only thought the thought of woman? The 
thought (as it were) of femaleness? And could send back this thought in 
its reflection only because the mother has been incorporated? The mother 
 that all-powerful mother denied and neglected in the self-sufficiency of 
the (self) thinking subject, her “body” henceforward specularized through 
and through. (Irigaray 1985, p. 183) 
Or again:  
                                                           
1 The ‘not’ is left out by the translator, to no apparent consequence. 
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Inside Plato’s  or Socrates’  cave, an artificial wall curtain  
reenactment, reprise, representation, of a hymen that has elsewhere been 
stealthily taken away, is never, ever crossed, opened, penetrated, pierced, 
or torn. (Irigaray 1985, p. 249) 
As Ms. Irigaray explains: 
Any hint, even, of theory, pulls me away from myself by pulling open  
and sewing up  unnaturally the lips of that slit where I recognize myself, 
by touching myself there (almost) directly. (Irigaray 1985, p. 200) 
(It is, incidentally, one not inconsiderable victory of radical feminism in 
the Anglosaxophone countries that the C.P.-obsession with sex, as 
revealed in passages such as the above, has been introduced into the 
pages of even the most technical scientific journals via the banishment of 
the unmarked personal pronoun and its replacement with a pervasive and 
senseless switching back and forth of gendered “she’s” and “he’s.”) 
2. Philosophy in Poland 
What, now, of the fate of philosophy in Poland? We note in passing how 
sad is the spectacle presented by the host of young students of philosophy 
in Poland currently devoting its energies to deconstructionist and to other 
non-serious and ultimately corrosive philosophical fashions. More 
important for our purposes, however, is the degree to which Poland’s 
own philosophers have fared so badly as concerns their admission into 
the pantheon of “Continental Philosophers.” Why should this be so? 
Why, to put the question from the other side, should there be so close an 
association in Poland – at least since 1894 – between philosophy and 
logic, or between philosophy and science?2 One can distinguish a series 
of answers to this question, which I shall group together under the 
following headings: 
(a) the role of socialism; 
(b) the disciplinary association between philosophy and mathematics; 
(c) the influence of Austrian philosophy in general and of Brentanian 
philosophy in particular; 
(d) the serendipitous role of Twardowski; 
(e) the role of Catholicism. 
                                                           
2 What other country – to mention just one symptom of the association I have in mind – 
would publish an encyclopedia entitled Philosophy and Science (Cackowski, Kmita and 
Szaniawski, eds. 1987)? 
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3. Socialism and Scientific Philosophy 
Much of what needs to be said about the Polish case can be derived, with 
suitable modifications, from considering the case of Austria. Consider, in 
this light, the following passage from the autobiography of A. J. Ayer, 
who in 1932 spent a protracted honeymoon of just over three months in 
Vienna before returning to Oxford to write Language, Truth and Logic: 
The members of the Vienna Circle, with the notable exception of Otto 
Neurath, were not greatly interested in politics, but theirs was also a 
political movement. The war of ideas which they were waging against the 
Catholic church had its part in the perennial Viennese conflict between 
the socialistic and the clerical reaction. (Ayer 1977, p. 129) 
A more explicit version of the same thesis put forward by Johannes 
Dvorak (also quoting Neurath): 
In light of the fact that the bourgeoisie – especially in Central Europe – 
had discharged itself of all enlightenment traditions and paid homage 
rather to the cults of irrationalism, while the proletariat struggled for a 
rational formation of society, the hope certainly prevailed that “It is 
precisely the proletariat which will become the carrier of a science 
without metaphysics.” (Dvorak 1985, p. 142) 
Not only Neurath and Dvorak but also other scholars working on the 
background of the Vienna Circle have defended a view according to 
which the flowering of scientific philosophy in Central Europe between 
the wars is to be regarded precisely as part of a wider struggle between 
left and right, between science and reaction. 
 I do not believe that we need spend too much time on this purported 
explanation as far as Poland – a land not of proletarians but of peasants 
and nobility – is concerned; but the reader is asked to hold her horses 
before rushing forward with objections to a political account of the rise 
of scientific philosophy in Poland along the lines suggested. 
4. Safety in Numbers 
At the dawn of Polish independence in 1917, as part of a widespread 
campaign in favour of the conception of science as a laudable form of 
public service in the cause of the new Poland, the mathematician 
Zygmunt Janiszewski committed Polish mathematicians to a program 
designed to take advantage of the talents of the Polish mathematical 
community via systematic collaboration and concentration on specific 
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problems and topics of research (see Janiszewski 1917). Janiszewski’s 
project, which proved to be of great success, is important for our present 
purposes for a number of distinct reasons: 
(i) The topics chosen, above all in the area of set theory, were such as 
to lead to the possibility of fruitful collaboration between 
mathematicians and philosophers working in the area of logic. The 
foundations for such collaboration were laid already in 1894 when 
Twardowski began to teach philosophy at the university of Lvov; 
at that time Twardowski advised his students to study the science 
of mathematics in addition to philosophy, and some of his 
brightest students subsequently fell under the influence of the 
mathematician SierpiĔski, who taught in Lvov from 1910.  
(ii) Janiszewski was conscious of the comparative advantage 
possessed by smaller countries in those fields of scientific research 
not requiring significant expenditures on facilities and equipment. 
One can point, additionally, to a certain comparative advantage 
enjoyed by scholars in countries such as Poland in those fields – 
such as mathematics or music – where the issue of the native 
language of the scientist or artist is of secondary importance. (The 
achievements of Poland in the field of mathematics are matched, 
significantly, by similar achievements on the part of Hungary and 
Finland.) These comparative advantages of smaller nations on the 
world stage can be carried over also to other spheres, including 
philosophy, and especially to those areas of philosophy most 
remote from issues of politics and national culture. 
(iii) Mathematicians, and logicians and scientific philosophers, may 
also enjoy the advantages of relative personal and professional 
safety in turbulent political times, in a way which may not be 
possible for thinkers working in such fields as ethics or political 
theory or history. The relative superiority of work done in logic in 
Eastern as opposed to Western Germany is, I believe, to be 
explained in part in terms of this factor. On the other hand, 
however, given the role played by logical philosophers in the 
Solidarity movement and in the Polish underground university 
during the war, it is more difficult to gauge the significance of this 
factor in the case of Poland.  
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5. Polish Philosophy Is Austrian Philosophy 
In his paper “Wittgenstein and Austrian Philosophy,” Rudolf Haller 
writes as follows:  
I wish [. . .] to defend two theses: first, that in the last 100 years there has 
taken place an independent development of a specifically Austrian 
philosophy, opposed to the philosophical currents of the remainder of the 
German-speaking world; and secondly that this development can sustain a 
genetic model which permits us to affirm an intrinsic homogeneity of 
Austrian philosophy up to the Vienna Circle and its descendants. (Haller 
1981, p. 92) 
The grain of truth in this passage can be seen already if we consider the 
degree to which the writings of such exemplary Austrians as Bolzano, 
Mach, Meinong, Twardowski, Popper and Gustav Bergmann, exhibit 
radical differences of style as compared to German philosophers such as 
Hegel, Heidegger, or Habermas who are standardly associated with 
Germany (see Smith 1991a; Mulligan 1993). Most simply put: the former 
employ a sober scientific style and shun pretensions. There are also 
associated differences pertaining to the differential role of science and 
logic, as opposed to that of politics in the two traditions  differences 
which, as we shall see, serve to explain why it is (certain selected) 
German and not Austrian philosophers who have been taken up into the 
bosom of “Continental Philosophy” in North America. These are 
differences which are rooted deeply in history, and they do much to 
explain why Germany – in spite of the fact that it has brought forth such 
giants of mathematical logic as Frege, Hilbert and Gentzen – has taken so 
long to develop a community of analytic philosophers on its home 
territory and why not a few of those most centrally responsible for this 
development – above all Wolfgang Stegmüller – have hailed from 
Austria (or more precisely, in Stegmüller’s case, from the South Tyrol). I 
have sought elsewhere (see Smith 1994) to demonstrate the degree to 
which philosophy in Austria in the period from 1890 to the Anschluss 
was influenced by the thinking of Franz Brentano, and as the manifesto 
of the Vienna Circle points out, many of the characteristic concerns even 
of the logical positivist movement were foreshadowed in his writings: 
As a Catholic priest Brentano had an understanding for scholasticism; he 
started directly from the scholastic logic and from Leibniz’s endeavours 
to reform logic, while leaving aside Kant and the idealist system-
philosophers. Brentano and his students showed time and again their 
understanding of men like Bolzano and others who were working towards 
a rigorous new foundation of logic. (Neurath, Carnap and Hahn 1929, 
p. 302)  
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In support of this contention as to the importance of Brentano, it is 
remarkable to consider the fact that the most important centers of 
scientific philosophy in Continental Europe – Vienna, Prague, Graz, 
Berlin, Göttingen and Lvov – were precisely those cities in which 
Brentano’s most distinguished students had held chairs in philosophy 
from the 1890s onwards. 
 Brentano was not only sympathetic to the idea of a rigorously 
scientific method in philosophy; he also shared with the British 
empiricists and with the Vienna positivists an anti-metaphysical 
orientation, manifesting an especially forceful antipathy to the “mystical 
paraphilosophy” of the German idealists and stressing in all his work the 
unity of scientific method. Brentano’s writings involve the use of 
methods of language analysis similar in some respects to those developed 
later by philosophers in England. 
 The thesis of an internally coherent tradition of Austrian philosophy 
is not, however, without its problems. Thus, while it seems that the works 
of Brentano, like those of Meinong and Husserl, were mentioned in 
discussions of the Vienna Circle, in the case of Brentano, at least, these 
writings were discussed primarily because Brentanian ethics was chosen 
by Schlick as a special object of scorn. Schlick himself was of course a 
German, as also were the three thinkers  Carnap, Reichenbach and 
Hempel  who are held by many to have made the most important 
contributions to philosophy of the logical positivist sort.  
6. The Serendipitous Role of Twardowski 
“Austrian Philosophy” is, in any event, by no means as unified a 
phenomenon as some might like to believe. Perhaps, though, we can 
maintain a parallel thesis in regard to Poland, where the role of 
Brentanian ideas is more easy to gauge in light of the singular 
dominance, in the history of philosophy in Poland, of one man: 
Kazimierz Twardowski. The influence of Twardowski on modern 
philosophy in Poland is all-pervasive. Twardowski instilled in his 
students a passion for clarity and rigour and seriousness. He taught them 
to regard philosophy as a collaborative effort, a matter of disciplined 
discussion and argument, and he encouraged them to train themselves 
thoroughly in at least one extra-philosophical discipline and to work 
together with scientists from other fields, both inside Poland and 
internationally. This led above all, as we have seen, to collaborations 
with mathematicians, so that the Lvov school of philosophy would 
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gradually evolve into the Warsaw school of logic, as Polish scientific 
philosophers availed themselves of the new techniques of formal 
philosophy developed by Frege and Russell.3 Twardowski taught his 
students, too, to respect and to pursue serious research in the history of 
philosophy, an aspect of the tradition of philosophy on Polish territory 
which is illustrated in such disparate works as àukasiewicz’s ground-
breaking monograph on the law of non-contradiction in Aristotle and 
Tatarkiewicz’s highly influential multi-volume histories of philosophy 
and aesthetics. 
 In 1895, at the age of 29, Twardowski was appointed professor of 
philosophy in Lvov, still at that time an Austrian town. This meant that, 
like the Jagellonian University in Cracow, its university enjoyed a rather 
liberal and tolerant atmosphere. Thus Poles were allowed to study and to 
be taught by their own lecturers and professors, where “in the other parts 
of partitioned Poland they were engaged in a most savage struggle for 
national and economic survival” (Jordan 1945, p. 39). Twardowski taught 
at the university of Lvov until 1930 and continued to hold seminars until 
his death in 1938. His success in establishing a modern tradition of exact 
and rigorous philosophy in Poland can be seen in the fact that more than 
30 of his Ph.D. students acquired professorships, and by the inter-war 
period his students held chairs in philosophy departments in all Polish 
universities with the single exception of the Catholic University in 
Lublin.4 As Tarski expressed it in a letter to Neurath of 1930: “almost all 
the researchers, who pursue the philosophy of exact sciences in Poland, 
are indirectly or directly the disciples of Twardowski” (Tarski 1992, 
p. 20). 
 It has been suggested that Twardowski’s teaching was in some sense 
philosophically neutral, that the unity of his school was rooted in a 
common training in methods and habits of work, rather than in the 
handing down of any shared doctrines. Jordan, for example, asserts that 
the members of Twardowski’s school were not linked by any “common 
body of philosophical assumptions and beliefs.” Twardowski led his 
students, rather, “to undertake painstaking analysis of specific problems 
which were rich in conceptual and terminological distinctions, and 
                                                           
3 WoleĔski (1989) is now the standard history of the Lvov-Warsaw School. On 
Twardowski’s teaching see Skolimowski (1967, p. 26f ), who refers to Twardowski’s 
“Spartan drill.” On Twardowski’s intellectual development see Dąmbska (1978) and 
Twardowski (1991).  
4 On Twardowski’s influence, see, again, WoleĔski (1989, Ch. 1, part 2), and also 
Skolimowski (1967, ch. II). 
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directed rather to the clarification than to the solution of the problems 
involved” (Jordan 1963, pp. 7f ). 
 While Twardowski held no truck with the system-building 
“philosophical” philosophies of the past, his work was nonetheless 
marked by a certain metaphysical attitude, which reveals itself in the 
work of those philosophers who came under his influence. This applies 
even to those – like Twardowski’s son-in-law Ajdukiewicz, also in other 
respects a noted Austrophile (see Giedymin 1982) – who were at certain 
times attracted by the positivism or reductionism of the Vienna Circle 
(see, e.g., Ajdukiewicz 1978, p. 348; Küng 1989). It applies to 
àukasiewicz, to KotarbiĔski, and to philosophers such as Drewnowski 
and Zawirski, who developed a conception of metaphysics as a 
hypothetical-deductive science to which the axiomatic method should be 
applied.5 
 The metaphysics to which Twardowski subscribed is that of Brentano 
(see Twardowski 1991),6 and Twardowski’s influence upon the content of 
modern philosophy in Poland can accordingly best be understood in 
terms of certain Brentanian ideas and attitudes which Twardowski 
conveyed to his Polish disciples. This influence reveals itself, more 
precisely, in the fact that modern philosophy in Poland is marked, on the 
one hand, by an attitude of metaphysical realism and, on the other hand, 
by a concern with the notion of truth as correspondence, both of which 
Twardowski had inherited – with some Bolzanian admixtures – from the 
early Brentano. Thus while Meinong’s theory of objects is a more widely 
known example of a generalized ontology built up on the basis of 
descriptive psychological analyses of the different kinds of mental acts, it 
was in fact Twardowski, of all the Brentanians, who was the first to 
develop a generalized ontology in this sense. As Ingarden puts it, 
Twardowski’s Content and Object (1894) is, “so far as I know, the first 
consistently constructed theory of objects manifesting a certain 
theoretical unity since the times of scholasticism and of the ‘ontology’ of 
Christian Wolff” (Ingarden 1938, p. 258, quoted in Schnelle 1982, p. 99). 
 In some cases, a direct interest in Brentano and his school was 
inherited from Twardowski by his students. This is especially true of 
Ingarden; but it holds also of LeĞniewski, and àukasiewicz was subject to 
                                                           
5 See e.g. Jordan (1945, p. 38). A similar conception is represented in the work of 
contemporary Polish philosophers such as J. Perzanowski and many others. 
6 As àuszczewska-Rohmanowa puts it, “Twardowski saw as his exclusive task the 
realization of the ideas of Brentano on Polish soil, ideas with which he himself in a way 
grew up and which he held to be indubitably correct” (àuszczewska-Rohmanowa 1967, 
p. 155, as quoted in Schnelle 1982, p. 90). 
 Why Polish Philosophy Does Not Exist 29 
 
the influence of Brentano’s ideas, too. He studied not only with 
Twardowski but also with Stumpf in Berlin and with Meinong in Graz, 
and among his earliest papers are a number of short reviews of works by 
Husserl, Höfler, Stumpf and Meinong. 
 It would be wrong to suggest that specifically Brentanian doctrines 
were taken over whole by Twardowski’s students. Yet the implicit or 
explicit concern with metaphysics, and especially with realistic meta-
physics and with truth as correspondence, is a constantly recurring 
feature of their work. Investigations in the ontology of truth, or of those 
relations between sentences and objects which are constitutive of truth, 
have been quite peculiarly prominent features of Polish philosophical 
writings from Twardowski to the present day, and they have coloured 
especially the Polish reception of the philosophy of Wittgenstein.7 Even 
the early work of Tarski can illuminatingly be viewed in this light, 
though Tarski did not himself study with Twardowski (see Tarski 1956, 
p. 155, n. 2; WoleĔski and Simons 1989). 
 At all events, though, it cannot be denied that an interest in the 
philosophy of truth has been a highly conspicuous moment of modern 
philosophy in Poland. The idea of realism, on the other hand, may 
initially be thought to have played a less prominent role. On closer 
inspection, however, we see that the realist attitude which Twardowski 
promulgated has in fact been taken for granted by Polish philosophers as 
something almost universally shared. Realism, even Aristotelian realism, 
is an unquestioned presupposition of LeĞniewski’s work and of that of his 
principal successors. It governs the work of Ingarden, dictating even the 
latter’s interest in the phenomena of aesthetics.8 It has been of repeated 
concern to Ajdukiewicz, and it has coloured also the work on 
epistemology of KotarbiĔski and his pupils (see Jordan 1945). And in 
each case, Twardowski has played a role in determining both the 
terminology and the thinking of the philosophers in question. 
7. Scientific Philosophy and Catholicism 
Can we, then, accept an explanation of the rise and entrenchment of 
scientific philosophy in Poland in terms of the uniquely powerful 
influence of Twardowski? Before we move to answer this question, let us 
                                                           
7 From a wide selection of more recent works one might mention: Borkowski (1985), 
Perzanowski (1985), Suszko (1968), and Wolniewicz (1985).  
8 See the Preface to his (1931); see also Ingarden’s critical writings on Husserl’s idealism, 
above all in his (1929). 
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consider one further factor, which turns on the fact that Poland, like 
Austria, is a Catholic country. For some have offered religious 
explanations as to why scientific philosophy should have taken root in 
these countries – but not in (Protestant, Northern) Germany. Here again 
we may turn to Neurath, who writes as follows: 
Catholics accept a compact body of dogma and place it at the beginning 
of their reflections, [thus] they are sometimes able to devote themselves 
to systematic logical analysis, unburdened by any metaphysical details. 
[. . .] Once someone in the Catholic camp begins to have doubts about a 
dogma, he can free himself with particular ease from the whole set of 
dogmas and is then left a very effective logical instrument in his 
possession. Not so in the Lutheran camp, where [. . .] many philosophers 
and scholars from all disciplines, while avoiding a commitment to a clear 
body of dogma, have retained half-metaphysical or quarter-metaphysical 
turns of speech, the last remnants of a theology which has not yet been 
completely superseded [. . .]. This may explain why the linguistic analysis 
of unified science prevailed least in countries where the Lutheran faith 
had dealt the hardest blows to the Catholic Church, despite the fact that 
technology and the sciences that go along with it are highly developed in 
these countries. (Neurath [1933] 1987, p. 277) 
Hence, Neurath claims, the “revolt against the metaphysical tradition is 
succeeding outside Lutheran countries in Calvinistic as well as in 
Catholic ones” and he notes with pride that there are in Austria “no such 
metaphysical autocrats as Heidegger, Rickert or others” (Neurath [1933] 
1987). 
8. A Copernican Shift 
Neurath is certainly onto something when he points to differential 
features of the history of Germany and Austria/Poland in this way. There 
are a number of severe problems with his specific thesis, however. Thus 
Heidegger himself was steeped rather in Catholic than in Lutheran 
metaphysics as a young man; and there are many Catholic countries, in 
other respects comparable to Poland, where logical empiricism and 
analytic philosophy have failed to take substantial root, just as there are 
Lutheran countries (Finland is here the most striking example), and of 
course countries of Anglican-Episcopalian filiation – not mentioned at all 
by Neurath – which have served as veritable bastions of the analytic 
tradition. 
 Similar objections can be raised even more forcefully against our first 
(political) class of explanations of the rise of scientific philosophy in 
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Central Europe (“‘scientific philosophy is the philosophy of the workers’ 
movement”). Not only is it the case that socialist movements in France or 
Spain or Italy, otherwise comparable to those in Poland and Austria, gave 
rise to no comparable movements in philosophy, but it is also the case 
that many of the most important thinkers associated with the Vienna 
circle and with the rise of scientific philosophy in Poland treated 
socialism with disdain (see Smith 1996). 
 What, then, of explanations of the rise of scientific philosophy in 
Poland which stress the role of Austria in general and of Brentano and 
Twardowski in particular? Here again there are problems, not least as a 
result of the fact that the available explanations do little to explain why 
the ideas of Brentano and Twardowski were able to plant such firm and 
lasting roots precisely on Polish soil, where the contemporary influence 
of Brentanism in Austria itself, and in other parts of the former Austro-
Hungarian Empire, is almost vanishingly weak. These problems become 
all the greater when one reflects on the tremendous difficulties faced by 
philosophers in Poland in keeping alive their philosophical traditions 
through the course of this country.  
 It may, indeed, be possible to adjust and amend the offered 
explanations in order successfully to confront this and the remaining 
difficulties and thus to provide a reasonable explanation of the rise of 
scientific philosophy in Poland. I would like, however, to look at the 
matter from another, quite different perspective, and to raise instead the 
question: why did scientific philosophy not take root in, say, Bulgaria or 
Tadjikistan? The answer to these questions is I hope rather clear: 
scientific philosophy, or in other words a philosophy that respects the 
values of clarity, precision, seriousness, rigour and technical competence, 
is the product of an advanced intellectual culture and of the Western 
university. But why, then, did scientific philosophy to such a marked 
degree fail to take root in Germany? 
 Recall, again, Neurath’s explanation of the metaphysical character of 
German philosophy in terms of the historical experience of the German 
people. We had occasion to reject this explanation when formulated in 
religious terms. What happens, however, if we recast the account in terms 
of the history of the Germans in the more narrow political sense? This 
manifests, from our present (certainly, radically over-simplified) point of 
view certain peculiar features as contrasted to the political history of the 
English or the Austrians. For philosophy has played a role in the history 
of the German state that is quite unique. Just as England has its National 
Theatre, and America has its Constitution and its Declaration of 
Independence, so Germany has its National Philosophy: Kant, Fichte, 
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Hegel, Schlegel, etc. are national monuments of the German people, 
whose memory is held sacred not least because they were so closely 
involved in creating that unified national consciousness which made 
possible Germany itself as a unified nation state. Philosophical thinkers 
were made to play a role in the history of Germany that is analogous to 
the role of Mickiewicz in the history of Poland, of Homer in the history 
of Greece, or of Shakespeare in the history of the English. From this 
point of view, it is no accident that the most impressive German 
contributions to philosophical scholarship have consisted precisely in 
great critical editions of the classical German idealist philosophers. (For 
a consideration of the role of these editions in German culture, see Smith 
1992.) 
 The size and power of Germany in the twentieth century has 
furthermore ensured that the Germans have been able to keep alive their 
national philosophical tradition and to protect it in a way that would have 
been impossible for the smaller nations of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Certainly outside influences have occasionally been absorbed into the 
large central mass of post-Kantian German philosophising. Elements of 
the thinking of Searle, for example, have been absorbed into the work of 
Habermas and Apel; but they have thereby been transformed into 
something that is, from the perspective of the analytic tradition in which 
Searle’s thinking has its origins, scarcely recognisable. 
 Attempts were made in the nineteenth century, in part under the 
inspiration of Fichte and the German model, to found a (“Messianistic”) 
national philosophy in Poland also: as the “Christ among the Nations” 
Poland has a quite special mission in the history of European 
Christianity. (Compare, in this respect, the work of such figures as 
Cieszkowski, Trentowski, Hoene-WroĔski; as discussed in Kuderowicz 
1988.) Such attempts proved to be of little lasting influence, however, 
and were, in fact already in the 1870s overwhelmed by the more forward-
looking so-called “positivists” in Warsaw, who accused the nationalistic 
philosophers of being too naively idealistic in their goals and of thereby 
promoting national tragedies. The positivists advocated instead the 
virtues of “small” or “organic” work, which consisted not least in the 
promotion of science among the people in the spirit of Mill, Comte and 
Spencer (see Jadacki 1994). 
 Now there is, of course, no important national philosophy in Britain 
or Austria, either: the imperial, multinational tradition seems for such 
purposes to be both too broad and too loose. There is also, and 
correspondingly, no particular concern for the purity or authenticity of 
the language of philosophy in England or Austria, for such issues there 
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do not go hand in hand with issues of national-cultural integrity. And that 
Poland, as the mother of many nationalities, is to be seen as being allied 
to England and Austria in this respect manifests itself further in the fact 
that the Polish intellectuals, too  from Twardowski, born in Vienna in 
1866, to LeĞniewski, born in Petersburg in 1886  have often been 
multinational in their aspirations and have thus not shunned the use of 
Western languages in their work.  
 How different is the case of Germany (and, by extension, France). 
The works of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Heidegger are master texts of the 
German people, and like all such master texts, be they the master texts of 
a religion, a sect, a people or a culture, they manifest that type of density 
and obscurity which goes hand in hand with the tendency to spawn a 
commentary literature, with all that this implies by way of association 
with the commentary literatures on, for example, Aristotle, the Bible, or 
the writings of Marx and Engels (see Smith 1991b). German philosophers 
have in fact for centuries been schooled systematically in the habits of a 
philosophical culture in which the most important textual models are 
associated with a need for commentaries and with what one might call a 
hermeneutic intransigence. They grow up further in a philosophical 
culture which is sealed off by firm disciplinary boundaries from the 
empirical sciences and which places a high value not on consistency and 
clarity, but rather on “depth” and “authenticity.” Teamwork and the 
exercise of mutual criticism and persistent argument, international 
collaboration, and indeed the search for any sort of “truth” in philosophy, 
are from this perspective simply out of place (see Puntel 1991). 
Philosophy, rather, is seen as something that should come directly from 
the heart, as a direct expression of the author’s soul or “spirit.” Consider, 
in this context, the mind-deadeningly repetitive stream-of-consciousness 
rantings of Derrida who shows how, in this as in so much else, French 
philosophy (or more precisely, that part of French philosophy that has 
been approved as part of “Continental Philosophy”), has become little 
more than a parody of its German model (the result of applying to 
German philosophy a Nietzschean sceptical rejection of the very idea of 
seriousness). 
 In the wider world, of course, it is not classical German idealism, with 
its national, textual and historical associations, but rather empirical, or at 
least scientifically oriented, philosophy that has come to constitute the 
contemporary mainstream. The latter is, for reasons not altogether 
accidental, a philosophy which values logic, argument and technical 
competence more highly than those literary, ideological and historical 
qualities which are at a premium in certain philosophical circles in 
34 Barry Smith 
 
Germany and France. Moreover, it seems likely to be the case that 
(whether for good or ill), as the discipline of philosophy becomes ever 
more a creature of the modern university, it will come to be marked to an 
increasing degree by the factor of professionalization, so that respect for 
technical competence and for the scientific method and the rejection of 
hagiography and the use of a mystificatory style will come increasingly 
to characterize the discipline of philosophy as a whole. The most 
prominent Polish philosophers have, when seen from this perspective, 
been speaking prose all along without knowing it. 
9. Why Polish Philosophy Does Not Exist 
If, now, we return to our question as to how we are to explain the rise of 
scientific philosophy in Poland, then we can see that this question in fact 
needs no answer. In Poland, exactly as in Austria, and Scandinavia, and 
exactly as in England and the rest of the Anglosaxophone world, the rise 
of scientific philosophy is an inevitable concomitant of the simple 
process of modernization. Just as the term ‘Austrian Philosophy’ is a 
misnomer to the degree that it suggests that there is a corresponding 
national or regional or ethnic philosophy, or a special Austrian way of 
doing philosophy that is unavailable to those born (say) outside the 
borders of the former Habsburg Empire; and just as the term ‘women’s 
philosophy’ is a misnomer to the extent that it suggests that there is a 
special way of doing philosophy that is available only to those of 
feminine gender, so also the term ‘Polish philosophy’ is a misnomer  
and for just the same reasons. For Polish philosophy is philosophy per se, 
it is part and parcel of the mainstream of world philosophy – simply 
because, in contrast to French or German philosophy, it meets interna-
tional standards of training, rigour, professionalism and specialization. 
10. The Law of Conservation of Spread 
Why, then, is “Continental Philosophy” so popular in certain circles? 
Why do young philosophers in Poland in such large numbers choose to 
read – or rather buy – the newly made translations of the ghastly works 
of Derrida and his ilk? Why, more generally, should intelligent people 
come to hold that it is not necessary, in doing philosophy, to meet the 
normal standards of clarity and precision? Why, indeed, should some 
have found it attractive to reject the very goal of clarity in philosophy, 
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and to praise, instead, the putative virtues of obscurity and depth? To 
answer these questions I should like, appealing to an analogy with the 
physicist’s law of conservation of matter, to advance a law of 
conservation of the various branches of intellectual concern which have 
traditionally, in the West, been grouped together under the heading 
“philosophy.” If one or other of these branches is in one way or another 
suppressed, or so I want to suggest, then it will somehow find a way to 
force itself through in some new and unexpected territory, or in some 
new and bastardized form. (If Marxist philosophy, broadly conceived, is 
no longer able to be taken seriously in the fields of economics or political 
theory, then it will rise again in the field of, say, “comparative literature” 
or “critical legal theory” or in the transzendentale Sprachpragmatik of 
Habermas and Apel.)  
Something like this, I suggest, has been the fate of many of the 
classical philosophical concerns now customarily dealt with by those 
pleased to call themselves “Continental Philosophers,” many of whom 
are grouped together in American universities in departments of 
comparative literature, of film studies, of “woman studies,” and so forth. 
For the best philosophical minds in the Anglo-Saxon world – and in 
Poland – have in recent decades turned primarily to logic and to the 
related branches of our discipline. To put it plainly: really existing 
logical or scientific philosophy, philosophy as concretely practiced in 
alliance with logic and science, has been overly narrow in the scope of 
the problems with which it has deigned to concern itself and has been too 
often associated with metaphysical standpoints (of nominalism, 
inscriptionalism, reism, eliminativist materialism, and so on) on the basis 
of which it is difficult, to say the least, to do justice to what we might 
call the phenomenological aspects of human existence. Those who have 
sought answers to the broader philosophical questions have thus fallen 
into the arms of those “Continental Philosophers” whose knavish tricks 
have been described above. Part of the blame for the excesses of the 
“Continental Philosophers” is, accordingly, to be laid at the door of Ryle 
and Quine and Carnap, who have played something like the same role, in 
the turning away from a unified adequatist metaphysics in our own day, 
as was played by Galileo (or the Galileo of Husserl’s Crisis) in an earlier 
period. (It is not for nothing that Quine, together with Heidegger and 
Derrida, is one of the heroes of Richard Rorty.) The problems of 
narrowness of scope and of metaphysical reductionism in philosophy 
were, perhaps, of lesser significance in Poland  where Ingarden, above 
all, kept alive the flame of Grand Metaphysics, but even in Poland there 
were some influential members of the Lvov-Warsaw School who have 
36 Barry Smith 
 
muddied the waters by being less than wholly clear as to whether they 
were or were not engaged in “metaphysics.” 
11. What Is to Be Done? 
How, now, should those – the contemporary heirs of Russell and 
àukasiewicz  be they in Cracow or Canberra, in Pittsburgh or PoznaĔ – 
who believe in truth in philosophy, react to these developments? Should 
they simply ignore “Continental Philosophy” and the text- and 
commentary-based traditions of philosophizing in Germany and France 
from out of which it grew? Can they justifiably embrace the hope that 
they will all simply go away? Or is it not much rather the case that a 
fashion economy, when once established, manifests a quite remarkable 
resilience? Should they, as is now all too customary, allow the 
inhabitants of the C.P.-ghetto of Heideggerians, Derridians and Irigarians 
to perform their antics undisturbed, whether in the spirit of pluralistic 
tolerance or in that of scornful disdain? To react in this fashion would, I 
believe, be a great mistake. This is not because I believe that the proper 
reaction to the cynicisms, relativisms and irrationalisms which 
predominate in so many corners of our “postmodern” world would be to 
form a new “movement” charged with agitation on behalf of the scientific 
conception of philosophy. For as Schlick, however dimly, saw, the 
formation of a movement of “scientific philosophy” – to be ranked 
alongside “women’s philosophy,” “Australian regional philosophy,” and 
the like – can only contribute to the widespread confusion of supposing 
that there are different sorts of truth (see Smith 1996): scientific truth, 
women’s truth, aboriginal truth, proletarian truth, aryan truth, Tadjik 
truth, German truth, Jewish truth, and so on. 
 Rather, we should orient ourselves more steadfastly around the idea 
that it is the proper business of philosophy to search for truth (for truth 
simpliciter), including truth in the various fields of the history of 
philosophy. This must imply also a search for truth even in relation to 
those byways of philosophical history and of philosophical concern that 
do not fit well into the customary and rather narrow picture of 
philosophical history which has been favoured by analytic philosophers 
hitherto. It must imply, indeed, a search for truth in the history of 
German and even of French philosophy in all its breadth. We should 
shine light, if one will, upon the dark places of our discipline and seek 
out the monsters that are breeding in its mists.  
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 It would be one incidental benefit of the study of the history of 
philosophy along these lines that it would help to make clear to 
philosophers and others that in former times, too, which is to say in 
previous dark ages of philosophical development, generations of 
philosophers have repeatedly been wont to declare themselves as 
constituting the “end,” or the “death,” of philosophy as we know it and 
have thereby engaged in competition with their predecessors in the 
wildness of the antics with which they have set out to support such 
claims. On the other hand, however, it will become clear also to the 
student of this catholic history of philosophy that such dark periods in 
philosophical history were in each case succeeded by new and healthier 
phases, in which truth and reason were once more, and with renewed 
vigour, given their due.9 
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